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UN-GREGG-ULATED: 
CAPITAL CHARGING AND THE 




In 2009, the American Law Institute (ALI) announced the 
withdrawal of its endorsement of the death penalty framework it had 
developed and promoted for more than four decades.1 Particularly 
troublesome to the ALI was the persistence of arbitrariness, bias, and 
serious legal error in the administration of capital punishment, despite 
many decades of procedural reforms designed specifically to eliminate 
these problems.2 In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly endorsed 
the ALI’s framework when it approved Georgia’s death penalty statute 
in Gregg v. Georgia,3 and in the forty years since Gregg, the Court has 
repeatedly defended the ALI’s framework amid challenges to its 
legality.4 The Court’s endorsement of the ALI’s framework in Gregg 
was especially noteworthy because it resulted in the Court lifting the 
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1.  American Law Institute, Report of the Council to the Membership of the American Law
Institute On the Matter of the Death Penalty (2009). This framework, described in § 210.6 of the 
ALI’s Model Penal Code, both set forth the procedure for imposing a death sentence, Model 
Penal Code § 210.6(1)–(2), and provided a list of aggravating, Model Penal Code § 210.6(3)(a)–
(h), and mitigating factors, Model Penal Code § 210.6(4)(a)–(h), for judges and juries to consider 
when sentencing convicted capital defendants. 
2.  Id.
3.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Georgia’s capital statute provided a list of
aggravating factors, but not mitigating factors. Under the Georgia scheme, any constitutionally 
permissible mitigation evidence could be considered by the sentencing authority. The distinction 
between death penalty statutes providing enumerated mitigating factors and those, like Georgia, 
that did not list mitigating factors would become immaterial because two years later the Court 
would soon rule that death penalty defendants were allowed to permit any constitutionally 
permissible mitigation evidence. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
4.  James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment, 1963-2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 50–89 (2007). 
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de facto death-penalty moratorium it imposed four years earlier in 
Furman v. Georgia.5 The Court’s approval of Georgia’s statute ushered 
in a wave of similarly structured capital statutes from states across the 
nation.6 
Roughly fifteen years following the Court’s ruling in Gregg, the U.S. 
General Accountability Office (GAO) commissioned a study to 
evaluate the existing evidence on capital charging-and-sentencing 
systems in the country.7 The report revealed that 82 percent of all 
methodologically sophisticated studies examining capital punishment 
processes uncovered evidence of arbitrariness and bias.8 A follow-up 
study conducted seven years later reported an even more troubling 
result: 93 percent of studies discovered evidence of arbitrariness and 
bias.9 In fact, since the GAO’s initial study in 1990, only two 
scientifically valid studies have failed to discover arbitrariness and bias 
in the administration of the death penalty.10 
So why have capital punishment systems failed to satisfy the 
conditions the Court set forth in Furman—which required the death 
penalty to be administered fairly and consistently, or not at all—despite 
functioning under the tremendous scrutiny of both the capital defense 
bar and general public? In this essay, I argue that at least part of the 
reason the promise of Furman remains unfulfilled has been the Court’s 
overly restrictive reading of its own rulings in Furman and Gregg, 
notwithstanding the admonitions from members of the Georgia 
legislature that enacted the death penalty statute approved in Gregg 
and the capital defense bar that challenged the constitutionality of the 
statute at issue in Gregg. 
 
 5.  408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 6.  STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 269 (Harvard Univ. 
Press 2002) (noting that “the Model Penal Code lived up to its name. Many states adopted the 
Code’s general approach.”). 
 7.  U.S. General Accountability Office, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates 
Patterns of Racial Disparities, GGD-90-57 (1990). 
 8.  Id. at 5. 
 9.  David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in America’s Capital 
Punishment System Since Furman v. Georgia (1972): The Evidence of Race Disparities and the 
Record of Our Courts and Legislatures in Addressing this Issue (American Bar Association 1997); 
cf. David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration of the 
Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on the Post-1990 
Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194 (2003) (reporting that nearly all studies of the capital punishment 
process reveal arbitrary and bias decision-making). 
 10.  See David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the 
Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999), 81 NEB. 
L. REV. 486 (2002); Scott Anderson, “As Flies to Wanton Boys”: Death Eligible Defendants in 
Georgia and Colorado, 40 TRIAL TALK 9, 9–16 (1991). 
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Part I describes the Court’s ruling in Furman—the precursor to 
Gregg. Through its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the Furman Court 
announced a conceptual framework governing the administration of 
the death penalty. Furman’s glaring omission was the lack of guidance 
to legislatures as to how to craft death penalty statutes that could 
successfully operationalize the core concepts articulated in the Court’s 
ruling. Part II highlights the various states’ responses to Furman and 
the Court’s evaluation of these statutes in Gregg. Part III explains the 
two key objections to Georgia’s post-Furman statute. The first criticism 
pertains to the inability of the newly crafted laws to eliminate 
arbitrariness and bias from the administration of the death penalty 
because of the statutes’ inattention to front-end and back-end 
discretionary choices. The second complaint focuses on the lack of any 
empirical evidence suggesting the new death penalty regimes, in fact, 
operated in a non-arbitrary and unbiased manner. 
Part IV discusses the Court’s significant narrowing of its holding in 
Gregg eight years later, in Pulley v. Harris, by ruling that lower courts 
were not required to conduct comparative proportionality review, 
which entails comparing a defendant’s case with similarly situated 
defendants when assessing the appropriateness of the death penalty in 
the defendant’s particular case. Pulley removed what many believed to 
be the most important procedural safeguard approved in Gregg, 
especially in light of the growing evidence that the post-Furman 
statutes were still being applied arbitrarily and discriminatorily. This 
section also argues that comparative review of death penalty charging 
decisions—something emphasized by critics of the post-Furman 
statutes but rejected by the Court in Gregg—is particularly important 
in light of the strong incentives prosecutors have to leverage the threat 
of capital punishment against death eligible defendants to induce plea 
agreements.  
Part V describes and implements an analytical framework capable 
of assessing the level of arbitrariness in capital charging decisions—that 
is, the degree of instability or inconsistency in prosecutorial decision-
making. This framework improves upon prior empirical research in 
three important ways. First, it measures arbitrariness in accordance with 
widely acceptable standards adopted from the social sciences. Second, 
it properly disentangles arbitrariness in capital charging into intra- and 
inter-jurisdictional components—an important distinction in the 
Court’s current Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence. 
THAXTON (DO NOT DELETE) 9/23/2016 10:00 AM 
148 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 11:1&2 
Finally, the framework permits a statistically defensible assessment of 
comparative jurisdictional performance, and thereby allows the 
determination of which jurisdictions are hyper-punitive (and hyper-
lenient) in their treatment of similarly situated defendants. 
Part VI reports the results from the statistical model applied to 
death penalty charging decisions from Georgia over an eight-year 
period. The consistency of capital charging decisions within 
jurisdictions for similarly situated defendants is extremely low. A 
measure of homogeneity (i.e., consistency) in charging outcomes across 
similarly situated defendants in the same jurisdiction ranges from 0 
(complete independence) to 100 (complete agreement),11 with scores 
of 70 or higher indicate a reliable decision-making process. The capital 
charging practices in Georgia received a score of 19.12 Moreover, there 
is considerable inconsistency in charging behavior between jurisdictions 
in Georgia. The probability that a factually similar case is noticed for 
the death penalty varies from 12 percent to 60 percent, depending on 
the jurisdiction.13 
I.  THE END OF STANDARDLESS DEATH PENALTY REGIMES 
The capital statute at controversy in Gregg was the product of the 
Georgia General Assembly’s efforts to craft a death penalty law that 
would comport with the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Furman 
v. Georgia.14 William Henry Furman, an African-American male, was 
sentenced to death for the killing of William Micke, a Caucasian male, 
during a botched burglary of Micke’s home. Furman appealed his death 
sentence to the Georgia Supreme Court and argued that Georgia’s 
death penalty statute violated his constitutional rights because the 
statute lacked sentencing guidelines and it was administered in a 
racially discriminatory manner.15 After the Georgia Supreme Court 
summarily rejected Furman’s claims,16 he appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Furman’s case was consolidated with two additional cases—one 
 
 11.  JOOP J. HOX, MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS: TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 14 (2d ed. 
2010). 
 12.  See infra Part 0. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 15.  Furman v. State, 167 S.E.2d 628 (Ga. 1969). 
 16.  Id. at 629 (“The statutes of this State authorizing capital punishment have repeatedly 
been held not to be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitution. . . . Hence, 
there is no merit in this complaint.”). 
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from Georgia and another from Texas.17 Both cases involved black men 
sentenced to death for raping white women. The Court believed that 
the defendants failed to prove their claims of racial bias,18 but held— 
five-to-four—that the lack of statutorily defined sentencing guidelines 
for juries in capital cases violated the Eighth Amendment. According 
to the Court, all existing capital punishment statutes—both state and 
federal—were unconstitutional as applied because they failed to 
articulate to decision makers any principled basis by which to 
distinguish those limited number of defendants sentenced to death 
from the thousands of other similarly situated defendants who were not 
subject to the death penalty. The practical consequence of the Court’s 
ruling in Furman was that 558 death row inmates had their sentences 
commuted to life sentences.19 At the time of the Furman decision, there 
were 43 individuals on death row in Georgia: 29 convicted of murder, 
12 convicted of rape, and two convicted of armed robbery.20 
Furman’s ruling lacked a true holding because all nine Justices 
wrote separate opinions. The five Justices comprising the plurality 
opinion—William J. Brennan, William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, 
Potter Stewart, and Byron White—were primarily troubled by three 
glaring problems with the existing practice of capital punishment: (1) 
the small number of death sentences handed out relative to potentially 
capital crimes; (2) the lack of statutory restrictions upon sentencing 
discretion of judges and jurors; and (3) sentencing disparities based on 
social class and race. Of these three factors, the first two seemed to gain 
the most traction.21 Justice Brennan believed that the administration of 
capital punishment was so arbitrary that it was “little more than a 
 
 17.  Jackson v. State, 171 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1969); Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Ct. 
Crim. App. 1969). 
 18.  See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Racial 
discrimination has not been proved, and I put it to one side.”) (citation omitted); id. at 450 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (“The possibility of racial bias in the trial and sentencing process has 
diminished in recent years. . . . Because standards of criminal justice have evolved in a manner 
favorable to the accused, discriminatory imposition of capital punishment is far less likely today 
than in the past.”). 
 19.  James W. Marquart and Jon R. Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-Commuted 
Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 5, 27 (1989). 
 20.  MICHAEL MEARS, THE DEATH PENALTY IN GEORGIA: A MODERN HISTORY, 1970-
2000 16 (1999). 
 21.  Justices Stewart and White’s opinions provided the narrowest ground for agreement, so 
their opinions were deemed controlling. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 11 (1990) [hereinafter EQUAL JUSTICE] 
(“Because each of the five justices wrote a separate concurring opinion stating a different 
rationale for the decision, the exacting meaning of Furman is difficult to decipher.”). 
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lottery system.”22 Similarly, Justice Stewart remarked that “death 
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by 
lightning is cruel and unusual.”23 Justice Marshall noted that it was 
extremely rare for convicted murderers to be sentenced to death.24 
Justices Douglas and White both explained that the Constitution 
required equality in the administration of capital punishment, requiring 
a principled manner in which to distinguish individuals who received 
the death penalty from those who did not.25 Only Justices Brennan and 
Marshall concluded that the death penalty would violate the 
Constitution under any circumstances, albeit for slightly different 
reasons.26 
 
The four dissenting Justices—Harry Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, 
Lewis F. Powell, and William Rehnquist—all believed that the Court 
did not have the authority to strike down the death penalty because 
Congress and state legislatures were operating within their power to 
prescribe specific punishments. Similar to Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, Justice Blackmun believed that the death penalty was 
morally repugnant, but he concluded that the legality of capital 
punishment was an issue that legislatures, not judges, should decide. 
Justices Burger and Powell both believed that death sentences were 
imposed with sufficient frequency and only reserved for the worst of 
the worst. Justice Burger remarked that the purpose of the Eighth 
Amendment was to ensure that certain punishments would not be 
imposed, and not to “channel discretion.” Justice Powell also concluded 
that it might be possible for a defendant to prevail on an Equal 
Protection Clause violation claim if the defendant could produce 
sufficient evidence that the death penalty was administered in a racially 
or economically discriminatory manner, but the Justice did not believe 
that the defendants had provided such proof.27 Justice Rehnquist, who 
just joined the Court earlier that year, believed that it was better for 
the Court to err on the side of upholding the constitutionality of the 
 
 22.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 23.  Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 24.  Id. at 362–63 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 25.  Id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 311 (White, J., concurring). 
 26.  Justice Brennan stressed that capital punishment did not comport with the notion of 
human dignity, primarily because of its infrequency, and therefore violated the Eighth 
Amendment. Id. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, on the other hand, concluded 
that retribution was an insufficient justification for capital punishment, irrespective of the 
infrequency of its occurrence. Id. at 342–45 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 27.  Id. at 450. 
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death penalty rather than mistakenly upholding an individual claim 
against the validity of a legislative enactment.28 
Justice Burger concluded that the plurality’s ruling left legislatures 
who desired to retain the death penalty with two options: (1) provide 
sentencing standards for judges and juries or (2) enact a mandatory 
death penalty statute. With respect to the latter option, Justice Burger 
believed that abolition of the death penalty was preferable to a 
mandatory death penalty. With respect to the former option, Justice 
Burger noted that, just a year earlier, the Court held that developing 
sentencing standards in death penalty cases was an impossible task, so 
the Court should not revisit the issue so quickly.29 In that case, 
McGautha v. California,30 the Court ruled that capital defendants’ due 
process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were not 
violated by the lack of statutory restrictions on judges’ and jurors’ 
discretion to impose death sentences.31 The majority opinion in 
McGautha, authored by Justice Harlan, expressly rejected the guided 
discretion framework advocated by the ALI and reasoned that it was 
both unwise and futile to attempt to determine, a priori, which factors 
would warrant a death sentence.32 The plurality in Furman was able to 
avoid explicitly overruling McGautha by reasoning that a 
constitutionally permissible process could still result in a 
constitutionally impermissible outcome.33 But Furman failed to instruct 
 
 28. Id. at 468 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“But an error in mistakenly sustaining the 
constitutionality of a particular enactment, while wrongfully depriving the individual of a right 
secured to him by the Constitution, nonetheless does so by simply letting stand a duly enacted 
law of a democratically chosen legislative body. The error resulting from a mistaken upholding of 
an individual’s constitutional claim against the validity of a legislative enactment is a good deal 
more serious. For the result in such a case is not to leave standing a law duly enacted by a 
representative assembly, but to impose upon the Nation the judicial fiat of a majority of a court 
of judges whose connection with the popular will is remote at best.”)  
 29.  Id. at 387 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 30.  McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 208 (“The infinite variety of cases and facets to each case would make general 
standards either meaningless ‘boiler-plate’ or a statement of the obvious that no jury would 
need.”). 
 33.  Justice Douglas remarked, “The high service rendered by the ‘cruel and unusual’ 
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that 
are evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that general 
laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups. . . . [T]hese 
discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with 
discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal 
protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments. Any law 
which is nondiscriminatory on its face may be applied in such a way as to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 256–57 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
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states how they should develop death penalty systems that would, 
ostensibly, pass constitutional muster.34 
II.  GEORGIA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY REGIME 
Drafting new death penalty legislation and reenacting the death 
penalty was the top priority of the 1973 Georgia General Assembly 
when it convened the following January after the Furman ruling.35 New 
death penalty bills were quickly filed in both the House and Senate. 
Several members of the General Assembly were prepared to defy the 
Court’s Furman mandate and simply reenact the old death penalty 
statute.36 Drawing from the ALI’s Model Penal Code, one of the most 
important proposed amendments to the existing capital statute was the 
inclusion of a pre-sentencing hearing in which prosecutors were 
required to prove certain aggravating circumstances relating to the 
crime or the defendant.37 Specifically, ten aggravating circumstances—
nearly identical to those listed in the ALI’s Model Penal Code—were 
developed.38 During this pre-sentencing hearing, the defendant would 
also be allowed to present mitigating evidence suggesting why the 
death penalty should not be imposed.39 Unlike the Model Penal Code, 
however, Georgia did not specify mitigating circumstances and the 
statute did not prescribe the manner in which juries should weigh 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.40 
In addition to the requirement that statutorily-defined aggravating 
circumstances be proven and mitigating evidence be considered at 
separate pre-sentencing hearings,41 the revised statute required 
automatic review of all death sentences by the Georgia Supreme Court. 
During this review, the court is required to perform several interrelated 
tasks. First, it must review the record and determine whether the 
 
 34.  BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 21.  
 35.  MEARS, supra note 20, at 18. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  1973 Ga. Laws 74; Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2534 (1973). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 24. 
 41.  Prior to Furman, Georgia, as well as a handful of other states, adopted a bifurcated 
procedure for the guilt/innocence and sentencing determination. Beginning in 1970, the Georgia 
death penalty statute required that a penalty trial was established in which the prosecutor was 
authorized to present information on the defendant’s prior record. See 1970 Ga. Laws 949. After 
the Furman ruling, the penalty-trial process became much more extensive because the prosecutor 
was required to both allege and prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of at least one 
of the statutorily defined aggravating circumstances listed in the revised death penalty statute. 
BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 8. 
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evidence supports the sentencing authority’s findings of the 
aggravating circumstance. Second, it determines whether any other 
claims of legal error affecting guilt or sentencing are meritorious. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court determines whether 
the death sentence is excessive and disproportionate when compared 
to similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant, and 
whether the imposition of the death sentence is the product of passion 
or prejudice. 
Proponents of the new legislation amended the statute by adding 
three procedural reforms: (1) a list of statutory aggravating 
circumstances that juries were required to consider before imposing a 
sentence; (2) a bifurcated hearing for guilt/innocence and sentencing; 
and (3) automatic appellate review by the Georgia Supreme Court.42 
They believed that these amendments would comport with Furman’s 
heightened reliability mandate for death penalty systems, and render 
the statute constitutional.43 
 
However, members in both houses immediately challenged the 
House and Senate versions of the new death penalty legislation. 
Opponents of the proposed legislation argued that the changes to the 
statute were merely cosmetic and that the new legislation did very little 
to prevent the unconstitutional application of the death penalty, 
particularly with respect to poor and black defendants.44 The legislation 
ultimately passed by a vote of 154 to 16 in the Georgia House of 
Representatives on February 13, 1973 and by a vote of 47 to 7 on 
February 22, 1973 in the Georgia Senate. Prior to the final vote on the 
new bill in the Senate, several amendments to make the death penalty 
mandatory were struck down.45 On March 28, 1973, Governor Jimmy 
Carter signed the bill into law and it immediately became effective.46 
Georgia’s new death penalty was originally published in the Georgia 
Laws 1973 Session.47 With very few changes, Georgia’s death penalty 
 
 42.  BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 24–25. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  MEARS, supra note 21. 
 45.  Id. at 35. 
 46.  During his campaign for the U.S. Presidency in 1976, Carter issued a position paper that 
brings into question his comprehension of the Georgia death penalty statute that he signed into 
law. Carter stated that Georgia’s death penalty was limited to “a few aggravated crimes like 
murder committed by an inmate with a life sentence.” JAMES E. CARTER, PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN, 1976 (1976). The Georgia statute, however, authorized the death penalty for a wide 
range of crimes, including rape, armed robbery, and kidnapping with bodily injury. 
 47.  1973 Ga. Laws 74, § 3; Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (1973). 
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legislation has remained in place since Governor Jimmy Carter first 
signed it into law.48 
Less than a month following the enactment of Georgia’s new death 
penalty legislation, on April 27, 1973, Jesse Lee Coley—an African-
American male convicted of the non-homicidal rape of a Caucasian 
woman—became the first person sentenced to death under the revised 
statute.49 Coley appealed his sentence to the Georgia Supreme Court 
and challenged, inter alia, the constitutionality of Georgia’s revised 
death penalty statute. Similar to its ruling five years earlier in Furman 
v. State,50 the court held that the new statute neither violated the 
Georgia Constitution nor the U.S. Constitution; nevertheless, the court 
overturned Coley’s death sentence, deeming it excessive when 
compared to penalties imposed in similar cases.51 Soon after the Coley 
decision, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the death sentences of 
two other defendants convicted of armed robbery, holding that such 
sentences were excessive and disproportionate to the sentences 
imposed in similar cases.52 
The following year, in 1974, Troy Leon Gregg—a Caucasian male 
convicted of murdering two Caucasian men in Georgia—received four 
death sentences: one for each murder and one for each armed robbery. 
Once again, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the new death 
penalty statute was constitutional and affirmed his death sentences for 
the two murder counts.53 Gregg then appealed the sentences to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, again challenging the constitutionality of Georgia’s 
death penalty statute.54 The Court granted certiorari to hear Gregg’s 
challenge to the Georgia death penalty system, and also agreed to hear 
challenges to death penalty schemes from four other states: two guided-
discretion death penalty states (Florida and Texas) and two mandatory 
 
 48.  Subsequent to the enactment of the death penalty legislation, there were attempts to 
lower the age of eligibility for the death penalty to sixteen and authorize the death penalty in the 
event a person was convicted of the rape of a child under the age of twelve. MEARS, supra note 
20, at 46. 
 49.  MEARS, supra note 20. 
 50.  Furman v. State, 167 S.E.2d 628 (Ga. 1969). 
 51.  Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612 (Ga. 1974). 
 52.  Floyd v. State, 210 S.E.2d 810 (Ga. 1974); Jarrell v. State, 216 S.E.2d 258 (Ga. 1975). In 
both of these cases, however, the defendants were also given death sentences for murder, and 
these sentences were affirmed by the Court. In Jarrell, the Court also affirmed the death sentence 
for the crime of kidnapping. 
 53.  Gregg v. State, 210 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. 1974). The death sentences for the two armed 
robbery charges were deemed disproportionate and vacated. 
 54.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
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death penalty statutes (Louisiana and North Carolina).55 On July 2, 
1976, by a vote of seven-to-two, the Court approved Georgia’s modified 
death penalty statute in Gregg, as well as the modified guided-
discretion death penalty statutes in Texas56 and Florida,57 but it 
invalidated the mandatory death penalty statutes in North Carolina58 
and Louisiana.59 The Court was convinced that the guided-discretion 
statutes adequately addressed Furman’s primary concern—the 
arbitrary and capricious manner in which defendants were being 
condemned to death—and would result in greater consistency in the 
administration of the death penalty.60 The Court justified invalidating 
the mandatory death penalty systems by underscoring that not only 
must the death penalty be reserved for the worst-of-the-worst offenses, 
but even among that limited group of offenders, the death penalty is 
only permissible for the most culpable offenders.61 
Another key commonality of guided-discretion statutes was the 
mandatory appellate review of death sentences by the jurisdiction’s 
highest criminal court that would assess the appropriateness of every 
death sentence imposed. The Court noted that the reviewing courts in 
Georgia, Florida, and Texas were required to determine whether each 
defendant’s death sentence was arbitrarily imposed, disproportionate, 
or the product of any impermissible consideration.62 Thus, the Court 
once again signaled that the consideration of both procedure (i.e., 
narrowing death-eligibility) and results (i.e., appellate review of capital 
 
 55.  The statutes crafted by legislatures in Florida, Georgia, and Texas imposed somewhat 
different requirements on juries and reviewing courts. The most important distinction between 
the statutes was the manner in which the sentencing authority was required to consider 
aggravation and mitigation evidence. In Georgia, once the jury found at least one aggravating 
circumstance, it was required to weigh all the aggravating and any permissible mitigating evidence 
when deciding whether to impose a death or life sentence. Id. Under Florida’s scheme, the 
sentencing authority was required to weigh aggravating and mitigation evidence and impose a 
death sentence if the latter did not sufficiently outweigh the former. The jury issued an “advisory” 
sentence by majority vote, and the judge was authorized to override the jury’s sentencing 
recommendation. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). Texas’s statute required the government 
to prove the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute 
and only impose the death sentence if the killing was unprovoked, deliberate, and the defendant 
was likely to commit violent acts in the future. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).  
 56.  Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262. 
 57.  Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242. 
 58.  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 59.  Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 60.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (noting that the Court’s concern about 
arbitrariness in Furman could be adequately addressed by carefully drafted statutes that ensure 
the sentencing authority is provided relevant information and guidance). 
 61.  Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 325. 
 62.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153. 
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sentences irrespective of whether the process was followed) were 
indispensable components of a constitutionally permissible death 
penalty system. In other words, the Court emphasized that a “fair” 
death penalty system must satisfy procedural and distributive justice 
concerns.63 In addition to constraining the discretion of the sentencing 
authority, a logical consequence of the guided-discretion statutes was 
the narrowing of the discretion of the charging authority because 
certain elements of the crime that were enumerated in the statute had 
to be proven to the sentencing authority in order for the death penalty 
to be an available sentencing option. The Court would repeatedly 
emphasize that capital statutes must “genuinely narrow” the death-
eligible class to encompass only defendants materially more depraved 
than the average murderer.64 
III.  THE CAPITAL DEFENSE BAR’S REACTION TO GREGG 
Critics of the post-Furman capital statutes echoed the 
aforementioned concerns highlighted by legislators in the Georgia 
General Assembly who opposed the revised statute: (1) the new laws 
were incapable of ensuring the constitutionally permissible 
administration of capital punishment required under Furman and (2) 
the lack of any empirical evidence that the new regimes were non-
arbitrary and unbiased.65 With respect to the first criticism, opponents 
of the new statutes posited that the statutes merely shifted the 
“unbridled discretion” of the pre-Furman era statutes to the front-end 
(charging and plea bargaining) and back-end (clemency) of the 
process.66 These critics argued that the revised statutes did not 
sufficiently address the various decision points commencing with an 
 
 63.  Glaring omissions from both the revised statutes and the Court’s analysis of them, 
however, were workable definitions of arbitrariness, bias, and disproportionality. The Court and 
legislatures employed intuitive understandings of these concepts, but they failed to translate these 
general principles into terms that frontline legal actors—e.g., prosecutors, juries, and appellate 
courts—could actually put into operation. How were errors of arbitrariness, bias, and 
disproportionality to be measured in the capital sentencing context? What baselines should be 
used? What threshold showings must be made before these various claims of constitutional error 
were cognizable by the Court? These key unresolved questions jeopardized the very “heightened 
reliability” required under the Court’s “death is different” approach to the Eighth Amendment. 
 64.  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (“An aggravating circumstance must 
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify 
the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of 
murder.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (mentally disabled defendants are not 
sufficiently morally culpable to face the death penalty). 
 65.  BANNER, supra note 6, at 273. 
 66.  Id. 
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indictment.67 The Furman’s “death is different” logic required 
heightened reliability and accuracy standards, so potential abuses of 
executive branch power needed to be monitored and, when 
appropriate, remedied by the courts. According to these opponents, the 
legislatures were required to craft capital statutes that imposed greater 
justificatory and evidentiary burdens on prosecutors during the front-
end discretionary processes and on governors and pardon and parole 
boards during the back-end. 
During oral argument in Gregg, Chief Justice Burger dismissed this 
criticism by suggesting that charging and clemency discretion were 
inevitable components of any capital scheme and outside of the 
effective control of legislatures.68 Justice Stewart, authoring the 
plurality opinion for the Court, remarked “Nothing in any of our cases 
suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant 
mercy [through, inter alia, not seeking the death penalty] violates the 
Constitution.”69 According to the Justice, Furman merely required that 
death penalty statutes channel the discretion of the sentencing 
authority and that the petitioner’s argument about prosecutorial 
discretion in charging was “nothing more than a veiled contention that 
Furman indirectly outlawed capital punishment by placing totally 
unrealistic conditions on its use.”70 
The second objection to the revised statutes was the lack of 
empirical evidence suggesting that the new death penalty regimes 
actually eliminated or at least significantly reduced the arbitrariness 
and bias that animated Furman. The model death penalty statute 
proposed by the ALI was an “untested innovation,”71 and neither the 
ALI nor the legislatures in Georgia, Florida, and Texas provided the 
Court with any data concerning the practical impact of the newly 
adopted death penalty laws.72 In Furman, the Court distinguished its 
Eighth Amendment holding from its Fourteenth Amendment ruling in 
 
 67.  Five major decision points were identified by these critics: (1) charging; (2) plea 
bargaining; (3) guilt/innocence; (4) sentencing; and (5) clemency. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 7–8. These various discretionary decision points were also expressly 
recognized in Gregg. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976). 
 68.  BANNER, supra note 6, at 273. 
 69.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199. 
 70.  Id. at n.50. Eleven years later, in McCleskey v. Kemp, Justice Powell reiterated that 
Furman was only concerned with limiting the discretion of the sentencing authority and the 
inconsistency in charging decisions did not violate the Constitution. 481 U.S. 279, 307 (1987). 
 71.  American Law Institute, supra note 1, at 4. 
 72.  CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM (2005). 
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McGautha by emphasizing the unacceptable risk of arbitrary and 
discriminatory outcomes, irrespective of a constitutionally permissible 
process.73 When the attorneys for the defendants highlighted the 
glaring omission of any hard facts that the capital schemes could 
actually do what they purported to do, the Court criticized the 
attorneys for failing to provide evidence that those schemes did not (or 
could not) satisfy the constitutional mandate of Furman.74 By failing to 
require state legislatures to prove that their statutes could, in practice, 
satisfy the heightened reliability and accuracy requirements, the Court 
appeared to all but abandon distributive justice concerns.75 Instead, the 
Court turned its focus to what could theoretically be accomplished by 
the new procedural protections of the amended capital statutes.76 
Gregg foreshadowed the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence 
for the next four decades. The Court has continued to deemphasize 
Furman’s strong concerns about actual outcomes of death penalty 
cases, has refused to test Gregg’s assumption that the guided-discretion 
statutes would result in accurately and consistently imposed death 
sentences, and has ignored social science evidence on the arbitrary, 
capricious, and discriminatory operation of the death penalty.77 Some 
scholars have suggested that the Court’s reluctance to embrace social 
scientific evidence of the constitutionally impermissible realities of 
capital charging-and-sentencing practices can be attributed to its lack 
of expertise in evaluating statistical evidence.78 Instead, the Court has 
continually focused its attention on whether state statutes have 
sufficiently narrowed the class of death-eligible defendants,79 whether 
the capital trial process was constitutional,80 and which crimes and 
 
 73.  See supra Part I. 
 74.  HANEY, supra note 72. Statistical evidence of racial bias in the administration of the 
death penalty was presented to the Court in Furman, but this evidence did not form the basis for 
the Court’s ruling. Only Justices Douglas and Marshall cited statistical evidence in their opinions. 
 75.  Liebman, supra note 4. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that statistical evidence of racially 
disproportionate death penalty charging and sentencing, even if believed, was insufficient to deem 
Georgia’s capital statute unconstitutional as applied).  
 78.  Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, The American Death Penalty and the 
(In)Visibility of Race, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 282 (2015) (“[M]any . . . justices may have felt that 
their personal legitimacy as jurists was threatened in cases involving statistical proof.”). 
 79.  Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (vaguely defined aggravating factors are 
unconstitutional); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
 80.  Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Walton, 497 U.S. at 639; Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 
163 (2006); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); 
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
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defendants were beyond the reach of the death penalty.81 According to 
Professor Craig Haney, the Court’s “continued treatment of the social 
facts and empirical data that document systemic failures in the 
administration of the death penalty as somehow irrelevant to 
constitutional decision-making seems increasingly indefensible.”82 As 
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg’s recent dissent in Glossip v. Gross 
emphasized, the Court must reengage with the social facts of capital 
charging-and-sentencing practices: 
Four decades ago, the Court believed it possible to interpret the 
Eighth Amendment in ways that would significantly limit the 
arbitrary application of the death sentence. But that no longer 
seems likely . . . . Despite the Gregg court’s hope for fair 
administration of the death penalty, 40 years of further experience 
make it increasingly clear that the death penalty is imposed 
arbitrarily, i.e., without the ‘reasonable consistency’ legally 
necessary to reconcile its use with the Constitution’s commands.83 
IV.  INVESTIGATING ARBITRARINESS IN CAPITAL CHARGING 
The Court in Gregg was careful to note that its approval of 
Georgia’s revised statute was neither a blanket endorsement of any 
statute similarly constructed, nor was it the only manner in which death 
penalty statutes could comport with Furman.84 Rather, “each distinct 
[death penalty] system must be examined on an individual basis.”85 The 
aggravating factors enumerated in Georgia’s revised statute 
encompassed a wide range of capital crimes, including both homicide 
and non-homicide offenses.86 Thus, it was clear to the Court from the 
outset that it was improbable that those broadly written factors, in and 
of themselves, could sufficiently narrow the death-eligible pool to make 
the administration of capital punishment less arbitrary or 
 
 81.  Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for non-homicidal rape of an adult 
is unconstitutional); Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (death penalty is unconstitutional 
for non-homicidal kidnapping); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty 
unconstitutional for juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (death penalty 
unconstitutional for defendants suffering mental retardation); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 
(2008) (death penalty unconstitutional for non-homicidal rape of a child); Ford v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 399 (1986) (death penalty unconstitutional for insane defendants).  
 82.  HANEY, supra note 72, at 216. 
 83.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760–62 (2015) (Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
 84.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  For example, at the time Gregg was decided, Georgia’s statute permitted the death 
penalty for defendants convicted of rape, kidnapping, and armed robbery when the victim was 
not killed. 
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discriminatory.87 The Court expressly recognized this potential 
shortcoming, but highlighted the indispensable role of appellate review 
of death sentences: “While such standards are by necessity somewhat 
general . . . the further safeguard of meaningful appellate review is 
available to ensure that death sentences are not imposed capriciously 
or in a freakish manner.”88 
As explained above, Georgia’s revised capital statutes simply 
redistributed discretionary authority to prosecutors (charging) and 
governors/pardons boards (clemency). As a result, appellate review of 
capital sentences would be neither the first nor last word in the death 
penalty process. Nevertheless, the appellate court’s review could, in 
theory, correct errors of inadequate charge screening by identifying 
factors in the cases it reviewed that warranted a punishment less than 
the death penalty, irrespective of the defendant’s eligibility under the 
governing statute. The appellate court had flexibility to engage in a 
more thorough assessment of each case with respect to the 
appropriateness of the death penalty, and not merely limit its review to 
trial error. The process of comparative proportionality review, entailing 
a systematic inquiry into similar and dissimilar cases, provided the 
vehicle through which these culpability assessments could be carried 
out. Moreover, arbitrariness and bias, on a systemic level, could be 
reduced by rigorous proportionality assessments at the case level. 
Individual punishments, both potential and manifest, that were 
appropriately calibrated based on the disciplined consideration of 
legitimate defendant and crime factors could increase overall 
consistency and accuracy. 
The Court significantly narrowed the scope of comparative 
proportionality review in Pulley v. Harris89 when it held that 
comparative proportionality review was not an indispensable feature 
of constitutional death penalty statutes.90 Consistent with its logic 
announced in Gregg pertaining to “individualized assessments” of 
capital statutes,91 the Court did not go so far as to completely negate 
the possibility that comparative proportionality review might be 
 
 87.  See, e.g., Chelsea Creo Sharon, The Most Deserving of Death: The Narrowing 
Requirement and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223 (2011). 
 88.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 194–95. 
 89.  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
 90.  Id. at 45 (“Examination of our 1976 cases makes clear that they do not establish 
proportionality review as a constitutional requirement.”). 
 91.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. 
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required for a particular death penalty statute.92 However, it reasoned 
that the California statute being challenged in Pulley was not “so 
lacking in other checks on arbitrariness that it would not pass 
constitutional muster without comparative proportionality review.”93 
Justice White, who authored the majority opinion in Pulley, claimed 
that “[a]ny capital sentencing scheme may occasionally produce 
aberrational outcomes, [but] such inconsistencies are a far cry from the 
major systemic defects identified in Furman.”94 But Justice White failed 
to reference any concrete evidence supporting his assertion that those 
major pre-Furman defects were relics of the past—a point not lost on 
other members of the Court. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan 
(joined by Justice Marshall) described a growing body of evidence 
suggesting the exact opposite: the post-Furman statutes had failed to 
live up to their promise of increasing consistency, rationality, and 
fairness in the death penalty systems.95 The Justice explained: 
If the Court is going to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities, then 
it cannot sanction continued executions on the unexamined 
assumption that the death penalty is being administered in a 
rational, nonarbitrary, and noncapricious manner. Simply to assume 
that the procedural protections mandated by this Court’s prior 
decisions eliminate the irrationality underlying application of the 
death penalty is to ignore the holding of Furman and whatever 
constitutional difficulties may be inherent in each State’s death 
penalty system . . . . Some forms of irrationality that infect the 
administration of the death penalty—unlike discrimination by race, 
gender, socioeconomic status, or geographic location within a 
State—cannot be measured in any comprehensive way. That does 
not mean, however, that the process under which death sentences 
are currently being imposed is otherwise rational or acceptable.96 
Justice Brennan was also troubled by the Court’s refusal to consider 
whether “comparative proportionality review should be required in 
order to ensure that the irrational, arbitrary, and capricious imposition 
of the death penalty invalidated by Furman does not still exist” and 
what form should such review take.97 He explained: 
 
 92.  Pulley, 465 U.S. at 51–52. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 54. 
 95.  Id. at 65–66 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (arguing that there was a 
growing body of scholarly literature documenting racial, gender, socioeconomic, and geographical 
discrimination in the administration of capital punishment in the post-Furman era). 
 96.  Id. at 67–68. 
 97.  Id. at 74. 
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Chief among the reasons for this unpredictability [in the death 
penalty system] is the fact that similar situated defendants, charged 
and convicted for similar crimes within the same state, often receive 
vastly difference sentences. The problem of error in imposing capital 
punishment is much more serious if we consider the chances of error 
in the system to be more than the execution of someone who is 
completely innocent [but] when we execute someone whose crime 
does not seem so aggravated when compared to those of many who 
escaped the death penalty. It is in this kind of case—which is 
extremely common—that we must worry whether, first, we have 
designed procedures which are appropriate to the decision between 
life and death and, second, whether we have followed those 
procedures. Comparative proportionality review is aimed at 
eliminating this second type of error.98 
Paying closer attention to capital charging decisions is especially 
important because prosecutors may have strong incentives to seek the 
death penalty against defendants even in cases that do not appear to 
warrant such a severe potential punishment. By pursuing the death 
penalty in eligible cases, prosecutors increase their leverage in plea-
bargaining negotiations in several ways.99 First, it permits them to more 
easily extract a higher (i.e., more severe) plea bargain—typically life 
without the possibility of parole—that would not be possible without 
the threat of the death penalty.100 Second, it enables the government to 
empanel a more “conviction-prone” jury through the process of “death 
qualification.”101 Third, seeking the death penalty substantially 
increases the defense’s workload without a concomitant increase in the 
government’s burden by vastly expanding the defense attorney’s role 
and the requisite skill set and financial resources.102 Fourth, the risk of 
an acquittal even in cases with genuine evidentiary problems is 
substantially lower because prosecutors recognize that defense 
 
 98.  Id. at 69 (quoting John Kaplan, The Problem of Capital Punishment, 1983 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 555 (1983)). 
 99.  See, e.g., Susan Ehrhard, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty: An Exploratory Study, 
29 JUST. SYS. J. 313 (2008); Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
475 (2013). 
 100.  Thaxton, supra note 99, at 505. 
 101.  HANEY, supra note 72, at 118–21 (describing the conviction proneness of death qualified 
juries); James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2097 (2000) 
(explaining that death qualification allows prosecutors to jettison “death qualified” potential 
jurors who are most likely to hold skeptical attitudes of law enforcement). Death qualification is 
a process during jury selection when potential jurors are questioned about their views regarding 
capital punishment in order to discover whether they will be able to follow the law in deciding 
what sentence to impose. 
 102.  Thaxton, supra note 99, at 485. 
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attorneys pursue risk-averse pretrial and litigation strategies and 
practices.103 Fifth, prosecutors understand that both trial and appellate 
judges, especially elected judges, are more likely to give prosecutors 
greater leeway because of fear that they will publicly blame judges for 
losses based on legal technicalities.104 Lastly, prosecutors’ concerns 
about reelection, career advancement, and potential public backlash 
encourage overreaching.105 Prosecutorial overreaching is facilitated, 
particularly in the capital context, by the availability of broad and 
overlapping statutory aggravating circumstances that permit 
prosecutors to seek the death penalty in nearly every murder case.106 
Discouraging the overly aggressive use of the death penalty may likely 
be the most effective way to reduce the overall prevalence of error in 
capital charging-and-sentencing systems.107 
V.  A STATISTICAL MODEL OF ARBITRARINESS 
A.  Data 
There are limited examples of jurisdictions requiring the collection 
and analysis of data on prosecutors’ discretionary capital charging 
decisions. The Department of Justice (DOJ), for example, collects data 
on all potential federal death penalty cases and front-end charge 
screening is performed by a committee with input from attorneys for 
both parties.108 Legislatures in Kentucky and North Carolina enacted 
legislation mandating the collection and analysis of capital punishment 
litigation data, as well as providing legal causes of action for defendants 
raising certain claims that were supported by the statistical evidence, 
such as racial/ethnic discrimination in charging decisions.109 In order to 
 
 103.  Defense attorneys in capital cases are more likely to prioritize developing mitigation for 
the penalty phase than challenging the prosecution’s case for guilt for the underlying murder 
charge. Id. at 486. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191 (2004) (discussing the potential tensions 
between guilt and penalty phase strategies). 
 104.  Thaxton, supra note 99, at 486. 
 105.  See generally Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 581 (2009). 
 106.  Kathryn W. Riley, The Death Penalty in Georgia: An Aggravating Circumstance, 30 AM. 
U. L. REV. 835, 853–54 (1980–1981) (explaining that the vagueness and overbreadth of Georgia’s 
aggravating circumstances are in conflict with the narrowing requirement articulated in Furman 
and Gregg). 
 107.  See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, An NTSB for Capital Punishment, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
151 (2014); John A. Horowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating A 
Committee to Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2571 (1996–1997). 
 108.  U.S. Department of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System: Supplementary Data, 
Analysis and Revised Protocols for Capital Case Review (2001). 
 109.  Kentucky Racial Justice Act, KY. REV. STAT ANN. § 532.300 (1998); North Carolina 
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more accurately assess the potential arbitrariness in death penalty 
charging decisions in Georgia, I collected data on these charging 
dynamics from 1993 through 2000. The dataset was constructed from a 
complete list of potentially capital cases (i.e., death eligible) from which 
the prosecutor identified and selected defendants for the death 
penalty.110 Specifically, the list of death-eligible defendants is comprised 
of all persons above the age of 16 who were convicted of murder and 
at least one statutory aggravating factor enumerated in the Georgia 
post-Furman statute was present.111 For each case in the dataset, 
information was recorded for the defendant, codefendant(s), victim(s), 
judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, the crime, and whether a notice of 
intent to seek the death penalty was formally filed by the prosecutor. 
During the period under investigation, prosecutors filed a notice of 
intent to seek the death penalty in 400 cases and fifty-four defendants 
ultimately received the death penalty.112 
Table 1 provides a summary of the variables employed in this study. 
The variables can be grouped into several general categories: crime 
(e.g., year, weapon used, statutory aggravating circumstances, 
contemporaneous felonies committed, and location), defendant 
(number of defendants, race/ethnicity, gender, age, prior felony 
convictions, number of children, marital status, employment status, 
education, family background, writing/reading/spelling ability, IQ, and 
psychiatric status), victim (number of victims, race, gender, and 
relationship to defendant) and case processing (filing of death 
notice).113 The dataset contains a much broader set of variables than 
 
Racial Justice Act of 2009, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A–2010 (2010) (repealed 2013). Under the North 
Carolina statute, for example, a capital defendant can have his or her sentence reduced to life in 
prison without parole if there is evidence proving “that race was a significant factor in decisions 
to seek or impose the sentence of death in the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial 
division, or the State at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed.” 
 110.  The data used for these analyses were collected from six different sources: the Georgia 
Bureau of Investigation (GBI), the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC), the Office of the 
Georgia Capital Defender (GCD), the Clerk’s Office of the Georgia Supreme Court (CO), the 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution (AJC), and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 111.  In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Court ruled that the death penalty was 
unconstitutional for defendants who were juveniles at the time they committed their crimes. Prior 
to Roper, Georgia permitted the death penalty for defendants ages 17 and older. The data 
examined in this paper focus on the pre-Roper period. Slightly under 3% of offenders in the data 
were technically death eligible but under 17 years of age. 
 112.  Of the 395 capitally charged cases in which the method of disposition is known, 59% 
(234) were ultimately resolved by plea and 41% (161) were resolved by trial. With respect to cases 
that were technically death eligible under the Georgia statute but in which the prosecutor declined 
to seek the death penalty, 39% (350) were disposed by plea and 61% (551) disposed by trial. 
 113.  Consistent with prior research, I limit my analysis to cases that ultimately resulted in a 
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included in the analytical model, but these specific variables have been 
shown to be most predictive of capital charging behavior.114 It also must 
be emphasized that many of the factors impacting capital sentencing are 
unknown to prosecutors or defense attorneys at the time of capital 
charging decision, and specifics about aggravation and mitigation 
evidence come to light in preparation for trial. As a result, an analytical 
model predicting capital sentencing decisions would necessarily 
include a more comprehensive set of variables stemming from the fact 
that prosecutors and defense counsel have access to a much wider 
range of information at the stage of the adjudicatory process. 
B.  Multilevel Framework 
In this section, I describe an analytical framework, referred to as 
multi-level modeling (MLM), that is capable of assessing the level of 
arbitrariness present in Georgia’s capital charging decisions along one 
of the key dimensions identified by the Court: reliability. MLM avoids 
two primary shortcomings of current sentencing proportionality review 
practices: (i) the failure to develop general measures of culpability that 
enable courts to identify comparable cases irrespective of factual 
differences and (ii) the failure to explicitly take into account the 
multilevel nature of capital decision-making arising from the fact that 
cases are nested within counties (or similar sub-state administrative 
units).115 With respect to the former, I provide a general measure of 
culpability, based on the relationship between numerous case-level 
factors and actual capital charging outcomes. Consequently, the 
statistical model is not unnecessarily limited by the requirement of the 
identification of factually identical (or at least very similar) cases.116 The 
culpability measure is comprised of a weighted scale of the explanatory 
variables listed in Table 1. Weights for each individual variable are 
determined by the variable’s observed relationship with capital 
charging behavior, net of the other explanatory variables in the model. 
Each case is given a culpability score based on a summation of the 
 
murder conviction via plea or trial. Cases vary in terms of strength of evidence, so limiting the 
focus to cases in which there was sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction serves as a proxy for 
the strength of evidence. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 40–42, 477. 
 114.  See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 49. Raymond Paternoster 
& Robert Brame, Reassessing Race Disparities in Maryland Capital Cases, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 971, 
984 (2008); Isaac Unah, Choosing Those Who Will Die: The Effect of Race, Gender, and Law in 
Prosecutorial Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in Durham County, North Carolina, 15 MICH. J. 
RACE & LAW 135, 171 (2009). 
 115.  BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 286. 
 116.  Id. 
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specific values of the explanatory variables for the case, multiplied by 
the empirically derived weight for that specific variable. Therefore, 
even when cases are not factually identical, they can be compared 
based on their overall empirically derived culpability score. 
In terms of the latter, I employ a statistical framework specifically 
developed to measure variability in outcomes for “grouped” data that 
properly distinguishes between intra- and inter-jurisdictional processes. 
Relevant for the purposes of this project, Georgia’s Administrative 
Office of the Courts (AOC) organizes the state’s 159 counties into 49 
superior court judicial circuits.117 Cases from the various counties are 
nested into corresponding judicial circuits because there is one district 
attorney per judicial circuit. Large counties typically comprise a single 
judicial circuit, but many smaller counties are grouped together to form 
a single judicial circuit. As a result, a single prosecutor may be 
responsible for charging and plea bargain decisions for several counties 
under her or his judicial circuit.118 Treating counties that share a single 
judicial circuit as if they were independent ignores the similarities they 
share in the administration of capital punishment resulting from shared 
decision-makers. The distinction between intra-circuit and inter-circuit 
dynamics is constitutionally relevant because the U.S. Supreme Court 
has explicitly recognized that reviewing courts are required to compare 
punishments imposed on similarly situated defendants in the same 
jurisdiction and compare punishments imposed for similar situated 
defendants in other jurisdictions when determining the proportionality 
of a given punishment under the Eighth Amendment.119 Thus, my 
statistical model offers the dual advantages of removing much of the 
difficulty that has continued to plague the proportionality review of 
death sentences: inadequate/inappropriate case comparisons and 
improper handling of the diffuse nature of capital charging decision-
making. 
Prior to discussing the virtues of employing the MLM approach to 
capital charging decision-making in greater detail, it is necessary to 
briefly describe the major shortcomings of prior research resulting 
from the use non-MLM approaches and how those shortcomings have 
impeded a comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics at 
play when examining the capital punishment process. While these prior 
 
 117.  JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF GEORGIA, YOUR GUIDE TO THE GEORGIA COURTS (AOC 
2003). 
 118.  See infra Table 2. 
 119.  Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1983). 
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studies recognize that between-jurisdiction processes may be an 
important source of variability in capital charging and sentencing, they 
have not properly incorporated this information in the analysis of 
capital charging dynamics. This has resulted in an incomplete account 
of the operation of capital punishment systems, and thereby limiting 
our understanding as to whether the death penalty is being 
administered in a constitutionally (and morally) permissible manner. 
Earlier studies have attempted to account for inter-jurisdictional 
differences through the use of “fixed effects”—that is, the estimation of 
a set of jurisdiction-specific regression coefficients that captures 
differences between jurisdictions for similar cases.120 This modeling 
framework is typically called “fixed effects” models, although the 
terminology has been the source of much confusion.121 
The jurisdiction-specific effects estimated from the data can be 
substantively interesting in-and-of themselves, but the fixed effects 
modeling framework is ill-suited for the investigation of death penalty 
charging data for several reasons. First, the models discard information 
from jurisdictions that contain only one death-eligible case. These 
jurisdictions, sometimes called singleton clusters in the statistics 
literature, are not unusual for death penalty data. Homicides are 
relatively rare compared to other violent crimes, and death-eligible 
crimes constitute a smaller subset of homicide cases, so it is important 
to utilize as much available data as possible to understand the capital 
punishment process. By throwing away valuable information due to the 
assumptions of the fixed effects model, the investigation of case-level 
processes, as well as between- jurisdiction variability, can be 
appreciably undermined. Second, fixed effects models require that a 
substantial portion of cases within a jurisdiction to differ in their case-
specific characteristics because the model focuses exclusively on 
within-jurisdiction variation.122 If most of the variation in case 
 
 120.  These jurisdiction-specific parameters represent differences between the jurisdictions in 
the probability of receiving a death notice for similarly situated defendants. The parameters are 
deviations from a baseline jurisdiction selected, a priori, by the analysts, so their particular values 
will change depending on which circuit is chosen as the reference category. In practice, one less 
parameter is estimated because a single circuit must serve as the reference. 
 121.  PAUL D. ALLISON, FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION MODELS 2 (Sage Press 2009). Prior 
studies have preferred the fixed effects approach, in part, because it can take into account any 
jurisdiction-level unobserved effects on case outcomes that may be potentially correlated with 
case-level explanatory variables. Id. 
 122.  The estimation of the jurisdiction-specific effects removes the between-jurisdiction 
variability from the model, so all that remains to be examined is within-jurisdiction variability. 
This is also why singleton clusters are dropped from the analysis—there can be no within-
jurisdiction variation with a single case or multiple cases that are identical across the variables 
THAXTON (DO NOT DELETE) 9/23/2016 10:00 AM 
168 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 11:1&2 
characteristics is between jurisdictions, then the fixed effects models 
can give misleading answers to questions about the effects of these 
case-level characteristics. Third, fixed effects models are particularly 
sensitive to the number of cases in each jurisdiction because removing 
just a few cases from a jurisdiction with a small number of cases can 
dramatically change the size of the jurisdiction-specific effect estimated 
from the data. This diminishes the reliability of the estimated 
jurisdiction-specific effect because slight changes in data unduly 
influence substantive conclusions about the individual jurisdictions. As 
a result, individual jurisdictions tend to look more different than they 
actually are when we focus on a broader population of cases or similar 
jurisdictions. Finally, fixed effects models do not allow inferences to be 
made about the between- jurisdiction variability in capital charging, 
including whether or not the variability is substantively meaningful. All 
of these aforementioned problems originate from a common source: 
the inability of the fixed effects framework to simultaneously consider 
within- and between- jurisdiction variability.123 
While prior examinations of death penalty charging-and-
sentencing dynamics treated inter-circuit variability as a nuisance that 
needed to be minimized or corrected in order to properly analyze intra-
circuit variability, MLM views the processes influencing intra- and 
inter-circuit variability in death noticing decisions as both substantively 
interesting. This has the direct advantage of addressing questions about 
intra- and inter-jurisdictional variability in capital charging that is 
relevant. Within-jurisdiction homogeneity in capital case processing is 
attributable to between-jurisdiction heterogeneity. When factually 
similar cases are treated differently depending on the jurisdiction 
where the case arises, knowledge of the institutional setting where the 
case is litigated is necessary to adequately understand death-charging 
dynamics. This is because, even after taking into account relevant case 
characteristics, the jurisdictional context induces interdependence 
between the cases in that particular jurisdiction. Between-circuit and 
 
examined in the model. 
 123.  See infra Part V.C. Fixed effects models present additional complications when the 
outcome variable is binary (e.g., Yes/No), such as a death noticing decision because estimating a 
separate parameter for each judicial circuit tends to produce incorrect results for case-level 
explanatory variables, and results in parameter estimates that are very sample-dependent. An 
alternative approach for fixed effects binary outcomes does produce correct answers, but at the 
cost of omitting jurisdictions where all cases received the same outcome and not being able to 
obtain the circuit-specific effects. Tom Coupé, Bias in Conditional and Unconditional Fixed 
Effects Logit Estimation: A Correction, 13 POL. ANAL. 292, 292–95 (2005). 
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within-jurisdiction heterogeneity can be investigated through the use 
of MLM because this framework provides the appropriate analytical 
tools to take into account case- and jurisdiction-level dynamics in death 
penalty charging through the careful recognition of the hierarchical 
nature of the data.124 Inferences drawn from analytical frameworks that 
do not explicitly account for the fact that death eligible cases are nested 
in different jurisdictions are often misleading because relationships 
measures at one level of analysis (e.g., between cases) do not 
necessarily hold at another level of analysis (e.g., between 
jurisdictions).125 MLM avoids making these inferential errors by 
examining how case-level responses are influenced by case-level 
characteristics, and how jurisdiction-level factors influence the average 
response for the jurisdiction. These case- and jurisdiction-level 
processes are examined simultaneously, thereby allowing the accurate 
evaluation of how jurisdiction-level characteristics also influence case-
level dynamics with improperly substituting jurisdiction-level dynamics 
for case-level dynamics.126 In fact, the MLM approach to modeling 
variability in capital charging behavior is central to correctly 
understanding capital charging dynamics.127 
C.  The Formal Statistical Model 
The basic idea of MLM is to estimate the mean and variance of the 
distribution of the jurisdiction-specific effects, but not the individual 
jurisdiction-specific parameters like the aforementioned fixed effects 
models. The estimation of these features of the distribution is possible 
because MLM imposes a modest constraint on the variability of the 
between-jurisdiction effects: the specification of a probability model 
for the jurisdiction-specific effects.128 This probability model assumes 
 
 124.  In the current context, within-jurisdiction heterogeneity can also be interpreted as 
“between-case” heterogeneity. 
 125.  Interpreting associations at the higher level as pertaining to the lower level is known as 
an ecological fallacy. The opposite of the ecological fallacy is an atomistic fallacy, and this occurs 
when one draws inferences about the relationships between group-level variables based on 
information about individual-level relationships. These fallacies are problems of inference, not of 
measurement. It is permissible to characterize a higher-level collective using information 
obtained from lower-level members. The fallacies occur when relationships discovered at one 
particular level are inappropriately assumed to occur in the same fashion at some other (higher 
or lower) level. DOUGLAS A. LUKE, MULTILEVEL MODELING 5–6 (2004). 
 126.  See infra Part V.C. 
 127.  MLMs have been used in other criminal justice settings—particularly corrections 
research. See, e.g., GERALD G. GAES ET AL., MEASURING PRISON PERFORMANCE: 
GOVERNMENT PRIVATIZATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 71 (Altamira Press 2004). 
 128.  Typically, a normal/continuous distribution is assumed, and search strongly suggests that 
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the jurisdiction-specific effects arise deviations from “typical” 
jurisdiction (i.e., county, judicial circuit, or similar sub-state 
administrative unit). Through the imposition of this constraint, MLMs 
avoid the aforementioned shortcomings of the fixed effects by: (1) 
utilizing all available information from cases, even those in singleton 
clusters, in order to provide better estimates of the effects of case-level 
explanatory variables and jurisdiction-level variability;129 (2) measuring 
the true/general effect of case-level explanatory variables by combining 
both within- and between-jurisdiction effects of those variables;130 (3) 
providing sensible calculations of effects for individual jurisdictions 
that are much less sensitive to random fluctuations in the data through 
“shrinking” those particular jurisdictional effects towards the typical 
jurisdiction;131 and (4) permitting direct inferences about the variability 
of the between-jurisdiction effect by specifying a model for the 
distribution of that effect.132 
  
 
results are usually robust to violations of this assumption; nonetheless, more flexible distributions 
(both parametric and semi-parametric) departures from but other probability distributions are 
available. ANDERS SKRONDAL & SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH, GENERALIZED LATENT VARIABLE 
MODELING: MULTILEVEL, LONGITUDINAL, AND STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING 113–17 
(Chapman & Hall 2004). I examined the robustness of the findings using alternative distributions 
and obtained similar results for the jurisdiction-level effects. 
 129.  In MLM, it is acceptable to have one case in a significant portion of the jurisdictions. 
When jurisdictions have few observations, their jurisdiction-specific effects will not be estimated 
with much accuracy, but the circuits still provide information that allows estimation of the 
coefficients and variance parameters of the case- and circuit-level regressions. ANDREW GELMAN 
& JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL 
MODELS 276 (2007). 
 130.  MLMs offer a compromise between within- and between-jurisdiction effects (called 
partial pooling). The effect of case-level factor is neither purely a between-jurisdiction effect 
(because the case-level factor can vary across cases within jurisdictions) nor purely within-circuit 
effects (because the case-level factor may be constant across cases within a particular circuit). Id. 
at 476–77. The variance of the parameter estimate will also be impacted by the weighting because 
the uncertainty around the effect of any particular variable related to the (dis)similarity of the 
jurisdictions. Id.  
  The proper measurement of the effects of case-level explanatory variables is not only 
important in its own right, but also key to examining arbitrariness because the analytical models 
must adequately take into account the effects of legally relevant variables on death-noticing 
behavior. 
 131.  The jurisdiction-level intercepts (i.e., average probabilities of death noticing given 
explanatory variables) are precision-weighted, taking into account the reliability of the 
jurisdiction-level effect. In practice, this means estimates from “rogue” jurisdiction (i.e., the 
number of cases in a jurisdiction is small or the within-jurisdiction variance is large relative to the 
between-jurisdiction variance) are pulled or “shrunken” towards the statewide intercept, thereby 
bringing estimates from the rogue jurisdictions closer to the more stable pooled estimate. 
GELMAN & HILL, supra note 129, at 476. 
 132.  Id. at 448. 
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A key advantage of explicitly modeling between-jurisdiction 
effects, rather than attempting to naively estimate the effect from the 
data using fixed-effects when data are unsuitable for such estimation, 
is the ability to comparatively rank the “institutional performance” of 
the jurisdictions.133 As explained earlier, this assessment is possible 
because MLM provides the proper framework linking jurisdiction-
level processes to individual-level outcomes without incorrectly 
assuming that individual and jurisdiction-level processes are fungible. 
For the purpose of this article, this approach permits an assessment of 
the level of potential arbitrariness in the death noticing process. 
Jurisdictions—i.e., judicial circuits in Georgia—characterized by large 
deviations in death noticing behavior, relative to the statewide baseline, 
for similarly situated defendants may be interpreted as being 
unjustifiably idiosyncratic given existing constitutional constraints on 
the capital charging-and-sentencing process.134 
MLMs can be mathematically described in alternative, but 
equivalent, ways. For this project, I adopt the formulation popularized 
by Raudenbush and Bryk,135 which is helpful for interpreting and 
specifying the hierarchical structure of the model. The model can be 
written in two parts: a Level 1 and Level 2 model. The Level 1 model is, 
essentially, a series of regressions for each Level 2 unit (e.g., judicial 
circuit). The unit of analysis is the death-eligible murder case and the 
sample size for each regression is number of death-eligible cases for 
each particular judicial circuit. This model captures variability in death 
noticing among cases within the judicial circuit. Formally, the Level 1 
model can be written as: Pr൫ݕ௜௝ = 1൯ = ݃ିଵ(ߚ଴௝ + ߚ௞ܺ௞௜௝ + ߳௜௝), where 
the subscripts i and j index the ith defendant and jth judicial circuit, 
respectively, ݕ௜௝ is a binary outcome indicating “1” if the defendant is 
noticed for the death penalty and “0” if otherwise, Pr൫ݕ௜௝ = 1൯ is the 
probability that the defendant ith in circuit jth is noticed for the death 
penalty, ߚ଴௝ (beta) is the circuit-level probability that a defendant is 
 
 133.  SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH & ANDERS SKRONDAL, MULTILEVEL AND LONGITUDINAL 
MODELING USING STATA: CONTINUOUS RESPONSES 50 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that MLMs have 
been frequently employed in education research to examine the “value added” by the school (or 
teacher) for the “typical” student).  
 134.  “By learning and employing multilevel techniques to provide actionable information 
based on an institutional perspective, analysts can position themselves as key partners in 
organizational dialogue and decision making.” Ann A. O’Connell & Sandra J. Reed, Hierarchical 
Data Structures, Institutional Research, and Multilevel Modeling, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INST. 
RES. 5, 7 (Joe L. Lott, II, James S. Antony, eds., 2012). 
 135.  STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH & ANTHONY S. BRYK, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELS: 
APPLICATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS METHODS (Sage Press 2002).  
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noticed for the death penalty (conditional on all explanatory variables 
being equal to zero), ܺ௞ are k explanatory variables with ߚ regression 
coefficients, and ߳௜௝ (epsilon) are Level 1 errors (case-level the 
deviation from the expected probability for the ith defendant in the jth 
judicial circuit).136 In order to meaningfully interpret ߚ଴௝, explanatory 
variables, ܺ௞, are centered at their overall (i.e., statewide) average 
values, തܺ௞ = 0, so the intercept is the probability of a “typical” case in 
Georgia receiving the death notice in the jth circuit.137 
For the Level 2 model, the unit of analysis is the judicial circuit, 
not the individual death-eligible cases, and the outcome variable is the 
circuit-specific probability (ߚ଴௝). Formally, the Level 2 model is: ߚ଴௝ =
ߛ଴଴ + ߞ଴௝, where ߚ଴௝ is the same as described above, ߛ଴଴ is the 
probability of a death notice for the typical circuit (i.e., the statewide 
average across circuits, not cases), and ߞ଴௝ (zeta) is a circuit-specific 
deviation from the statewide average.138 This Level 2 model is 
sometimes referred to as a “intercepts as outcomes” or “means as 
outcomes” model.139 The total variance of the random intercept, 
ܸܽݎ൫ߚ଴௝൯ = ܸܽݎ൫ߞ଴௝൯ + ܸܽݎ൫߳௜௝൯ = ߰ + ߠ,, where ߰ (psi) is the 
 
 136.  Here ݃ିଵ(⋅) is the inverse link function (also called the logistic function), so 
Pr൫ݕ௜௝ = 1൯ = ୣ୶୮(ఉబೕାఉೖ௑ೖ೔ೕାఢ೔ೕ)ଵାୣ୶୮൫ఉబೕାఉೖ௑ೖ೔ೕାఢ೔ೕ൯. Technically speaking, there is no Level 1 residual error (߳௜௝) in this mathematical expression, but ߳௜௝ appears in another equivalent formulation: ݕ௜௝∗ = ߚ଴௝ +
ߚ௞ܺ௞௜௝ + ߳௜௝, where ݕ௜௝∗  represents the propensity to notice a case for the death penalty, such that 
ݕ௜௝ = 1 if ݕ௜௝∗ > 0 and ݕ௜௝ = 0 if ݕ௜௝∗ ≤ 0. The equivalence of the two equations can be shown: 
Pr൫ݕ௜௝ = 1൯ = Pr(ߚ଴௝ + ߚ௞ܺ௞௜௝ + ߳௜௝ > 0). Nevertheless, I include ߳௜௝ in the prior equation in order 
to make the interpretation of the regression coefficients more intuitive and relationship of the 
variance components more apparent in the MLM framework. 
 137.  As an alternative to explanatory variables centered at the average values for all of the 
judicial circuits combined (called “grand-mean” centering), one can center explanatory variables 
at their average circuit levels (called “group-mean” centering). Now the interpretation of the 
intercept becomes the probability that the “typical” case in the jth judicial circuit (not the entire 
state) receives a death notice. 
 138.  The ߞ’s are not model parameters, but are quantities of interest predicted from the 
estimated parameters (the ߚ’s and ߰) which are treated as known. The ߞ’s can be used to compare 
the various circuits in terms of their punitiveness (or leniency) with respect to death noticing 
behavior because ߞ’s are residual deviations—that is, they measure the circuit deviation for 
factually similar cases. 
 139.  The Level 2 model cannot be estimated on its own because the random intercept, ߚ଴௝, is 
not observed. Instead, the Level 2 model must be substituted in the Level 1 model to obtain a 
reduced form model for the observed responses: ݕ௜௝∗ = ߛ଴଴ + ߞ଴௝ + ߚ௞ܺ௞௜௝ + ߳௜௝, where (ߛ଴଴ +
ߞ଴௝) = ߚ଴௝. 
  It should be emphasized that MLM accomplishes more than simply providing a means 
of assessing the independent contributions of compositional and contextual effects because MLM 
also provides a way of showing how, and for which types of cases, contextual effects matter. The 
effect of a particular case-level factor, such as race/ethnicity or sex, may be stronger (or weaker) 
in one jurisdiction compared to another, and circuit-level characteristics are likely to account for 
the magnitude of these effects. I examine variation in the effect of case-level factors on death 
noticing elsewhere, see Sherod Thaxton, Disciplining Death, ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017). 
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between-circuit variance, ܸܽݎ(ߞ௝), and ߠ (theta) is the within-circuit 
variance, ܸܽݎ(߳௜௝).140 When case-level explanatory variables, ܺ௞, are 
included in the model ߰ and ߠ are residual variances—i.e., variability 
left unexplained after taking into account the explanatory variables. 
Under the assumption that the key legal features of the death noticing 
process have been included in the model (see Table 1) or have been 
proxied by other variables included in the model, these two variance 
components can be used to measure the level of arbitrariness in death 
noticing decision-making. 
As noted above, a key feature of MLM is the ability to calculate 
a measure of the (in)consistency in outcomes from observations nested 
in circuits. One such measure, the intra-class correlation (ICC), 
captures the (in)stability of in death noticing decisions. Specifically, 
this statistic represents dependence among the death-noticing 
outcomes in the same circuit (i.e., within-circuit dependence), 
conditional on the explanatory variables, and can be thought of “as an 
estimate of the extent to which rat[ings] are interchangeable—that is, 
the extent to which one rat[ing] from a group may represent all the 
rat[ings] within the group.”141 Formally, ICC = (߰ ߰ + ߠ⁄ ), where ߰ 
and ߠ are the same as described above. The statistic is the proportion 
of the total residual variability in death noticing that is attributable to 
between-circuit processes. Within-circuit similarity or consistency will 
 
 140.  For the logistic regression model, ߠ has a fixed variance that is specified, a priori, by the 
logistic distribution: ߠ = గమଷ ≈ 3.29. The use of a linear probability model (LPM), which treats a 
binary outcome variable as continuous, to examine clustered data will give misleading results 
because ߠ will be incorrectly estimated from the data, and therefore inferences based on those 
statistics (e.g., circuit-level effect) will be unreliable. 
  The LPM suffers from two additional limitations that makes it ill-suited for the current 
project. First, the LPM assumes that the relationship between the explanatory variables and the 
binary outcome variable is linear, which is an unrealistic assumption for this project because the 
explanatory variables attempt to index a defendant’s culpability level. For example, it is 
improbable that the impact of an increase in the number of victims in a homicide case on the 
probability that a defendant receives the death penalty is the same when the number increases 
from one to two as it would be from five to six. The logistic regression model explicitly takes this 
nonlinearity into account to properly estimate the relationships between explanatory variables 
and the probability of receiving a death notice. Second, with respect to forecasting probabilities—
i.e., predicting the likelihood of the death penalty for cases, particular cases not included in the 
estimation sample—the LPM is much more likely give probabilities that are less than “0” and 
greater than “1.” These out-of-range predictions are caused, in part, by the erroneous assumption 
of a linear relationship between the explanatory variables and the binary outcome variable. 
Although it is possible to round the predictions up or down to obtain probabilities bounded at 
zero and one, the out-of-range predictions are strong evidence that data do not meet the 
assumptions of the model. 
 141.  Katherine J. Klein and Steve W.J. Kozlowski, From Micro to Meso: Critical Steps in 
Conceptualizing and Conducting Multilevel Research, 3 ORG. RES. METHODS 211, 224 (2000). 
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be especially apparent when a large proportion of the total residual 
variability in death noticing behavior is between-circuit. When the ICC 
is large, a death-noticing decision from single case from a circuit is 
likely to represent other factually similar cases in the circuit, therefore 
one can infer a strong dependency (i.e., consistency) across cases within 
the circuit.142 On the other hand, when the ICC is small, charging 
decisions for individual cases can be viewed as inconsistent (or 
independent). At this point it should be apparent that both within-
circuit dependence and between-circuit heterogeneity are different 
ways of describing the same phenomenon. Both are zero when there is 
no between-circuit variance (߰ = 0) and both increase when the 
between-circuit variance increases relative to the within-circuit 
variance. The ICC ranges from 0 to 1. Although there are no hard and 
fast rules for interpreting the ICC, a general rule of thumb is an ICC 
value above 0.7 is indicative of a very reliable system.143 Alternatively, 
an ICC below 0.4 is indicative a very poor reliability.144 
VI.  RESULTS 
A.  Arbitrariness/Inconsistency 
The first step in understanding the level of arbitrariness in 
death penalty decision-making is the calculation of a baseline measure 
of variability death noticing behavior in order to get a sense of how 
much is attributable to within- and between-circuit dynamics. This 
baseline measure is obtained by estimating the ICC for an “empty 
model” that does not include any explanatory variables. The measure 
is referred to as the unconditional ICC and simply describes the degree 
of dependence of death noticing within judicial circuits. The ICC for 
the empty model is .14, which indicates low reliability in charging 
within circuits. The conditional model that includes 35 case-level 
predictors results an ICC of 0.18, suggesting very low reliability in 
charging behavior for cases that are factually similar within the same 
judicial circuit. The ICC increased by a very modest .04 after adding a 
 
 142.  GELMAN AND HILL, supra note 129, at 258. 
 143.  Charles E. Lance, Marcus Butts & Lawrence C. Michels, The Sources of Four 
Commonly Reported Cutoff Criteria What Did They Really Say?, 9 ORG. RES. METHODS 202, 205 
(2006). Cicchetti suggests the following thresholds for the ICC: less than .40 (poor); between .40 
and .59 (fair); between 0.60 and 0.74 (good); above .75 (excellent). Domenic V. Cicchetti, 
Guidelines, Criteria, and Rules of Thumb for Evaluating Normed and Standardized Assessment 
Instruments in Psychology, 6 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 284 (1994). 
 144.  Generally speaking, the use of MLM is warranted whenever the ICC of above .05. 
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host of key explanatory variables to the model.145 This is particularly 
noteworthy because Furman and its progeny emphasized the 
importance of both consistency and rationality in death penalty 
decision-making. The very slight improvement in the consistency of 
death noticing practices within circuits after taking into account these 
legally relevant case characteristics strongly suggests that the Georgia’s 
existing capital statute has done very little to constrain prosecutorial 
discretion. 
B.  Institutional Performance 
The ICC is an extremely useful statistic for understanding 
inconsistency in capital charging decisions within and across circuits, 
but it does not provide information on specific circuits. Recall that an 
important feature of the MLM framework is the ability to assess 
institutional performance.146 Specifically, MLM permits the calculation 
of sensible values for the jurisdiction-specific residual error terms, 
thereby facilitating a meaningful ranking of the jurisdiction-level effect 
relative to other jurisdictions. By way of example, in education 
research, where student performance is often the outcome variable, 
school-specific effects obtained from MLM are interpreted as the 
“value added” by the school for the “typical” student in the school 
district.147 With respect to the capital punishment process, circuit-
specific effects can be defined as the jurisdiction’s degree of 
punitiveness (or leniency) relative to the other circuits. In other words, 
circuits engaging in death noticing behavior exhibiting a substantial 
deviation from the typical circuit, even after taking into account a host 
of legally relevant explanatory variables established through statutes 
and legal precedent, are likely to be deemed as unjustifiably 
idiosyncratic. 
The comparative performance of judicial circuits for the typical 
case in Georgia can be depicted graphically to provide a more intuitive 
presentation of the results. Figures 1 and 2 reveal that cases that are 
factually similar along several key dimensions included in the model, 
including the overall level of aggravation according to Georgia’s capital 
statute and important mitigating evidence, are processed very 
 
 145.  See infra Table 1 for list of variables included in the case-level regression model. 
 146.  See RABE-HESKETH & SKRONDAL, supra note 133. 
 147.  RABE-HESKETH & ANDERS SKRONDAL, supra note 133, at 50; accord RAUDENBUSH & 
BRYK, supra note 135. 
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differently across Georgia’s judicial circuits.148 That is, these two figures 
display inter-circuit differences in the probability that a death-eligible 
homicide will be charged capitally. Figure 1 depicts the information 
spatially on a map of Georgia. The legend located to the left of the map 
displays a color grid (in grayscale) corresponding to the magnitude of 
the probability of receiving a death notice for each circuit. The black 
horizontal line in Figure 2 represents the statewide probability of a 
death-eligible defendant receiving a death notice (.33) and the black 
circles denote the probability of a death notice for each judicial 
circuit.149 The name of the specific circuit is listed along the horizontal 
axis. The probability of a death-eligible defendant receiving a death 
notice ranges from approximately .12 (Atlanta Circuit) to .59 
(Ocmulgee Circuit). The mean absolute deviation (MAD)—the 
average difference of the circuit-level probabilities from the state-wide 
probability for the model—is 8%.150 The MAD assesses how different, 
on average, the circuits are from the statewide average. In other words, 
the “typical” circuit death-noticing probability differs from the 
statewide probability by 8 percentage points—the Ocumglee Circuit is 
26 percent points above statewide average, whereas the Atlanta Circuit 
is 21 percent points below the statewide average.151 
Perhaps a more useful metric institutional performance are 
predictions of the expected number of death notices filed across the 
state if the charging behavior of the entire state resembled the charging 
behavior of particular circuits. As described above, prosecutors from 
some judicial circuits are significantly more likely to seek the death 
penalty in a typical case than prosecutors from other circuits. These 
judicial circuits can be ranked and then organized into percentiles. 
Griffin, Northeastern, and Cobb Circuits represent, respectively, the 
95th, 50th, and 5th percentiles of the distribution of circuits (see Table 3). 
The actual number of death notices filed in Georgia during the time 
 
 148.  See supra Part V.A for a discussion of variables included in the model. 
 149.  Because this is the statewide probability of a death notice, based on all of the death-
eligible cases in the state during the time period, this is the probability that the “average” case 
receives a death notice. 
 150.  The MAD is an estimate of the spread of ratings and is calculated by subtracting the 
mean of a distribution of ratings from each of the absolute values of the ratings and then taking 
the mean of the resulting scores. ෌หߨ௝ − ߤห/ܬ, where ߨ௝ is the circuit-level predicted probability 
of a death notice, ߤ is the statewide predicted probability, and J is the total number of circuits. 
DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS & METHODOLOGY: A NONTECHNICAL GUIDE FOR THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 89 (W. Paul Vogt ed., 2005). 
 151.  The median absolute deviation—which is more resistant to extreme circuit values—for 
models is 7%. 
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period under investigation was 400.152 If prosecutors across the entire 
state were as aggressive in seeking the death penalty as prosecutors in 
Griffin Circuit (95th percentile), then one would expect 681 death 
notices during the same time period—an increase of approximately 
70%. At the 50th percentile (Northeastern Circuit), the expected 
number of death notices would be 413—very close to the 400 death 
notices actually filed during across the state. When statewide charging 
dynamics mirror Cobb Circuit, which represented the 5th percentile, 
only 274 death notices are expected to be filed—a decrease of 
approximately 30%. Again, it must be emphasized that these 
predictions are based on cases that are factually similar both with 
respect to defendant and crime characteristics along the variables 
described in Table 1. These results strongly suggest that some circuits 
are extremely idiosyncratic in their death noticing behavior and the 
unreliability/inconsistency in capital charging associated with legally 
irrelevant geographic differences emphasized by Justice Brennan in 
Gregg and Pulley remain significant obstacles to the fair administration 
of the death penalty in the post-Furman era. 
CONCLUSION 
In the quarter-century since the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office commissioned a study to evaluate the 
constitutionality of the operation of post-Furman capital punishment 
regimes, only two studies have failed to uncover evidence of 
arbitrariness and bias.153 These persistent problems in the 
administration of the death penalty are attributable, in large part, to 
broadly written capital statutes that fail to sufficiently narrow the class 
of death eligible defendants and place tremendous power in the hands 
of prosecutors.154 Critics of these post-Furman statutes were well aware 
that rigorous judicial review of charging, sentencing, and clemency 
decisions was absolutely essential to the rational and even-handed 
functioning of death penalty systems. The majority opinions in Gregg 
and Pulley interpreting the requirements established by, respectively, 
Furman and Gregg, removed much of the regulatory force of Furman 
and has recently led the American Law Institute—the initial architects 
of the statute at issue in Gregg—to disavow that very framework. Post-
 
 152.  See supra Part V.A. 
 153.  See supra Part I. 
 154.  See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net: Another Decade of Legislative 
Expansion of the Death Penalty in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 25 (2006). 
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Furman death penalty systems must take serious the constitutional 
mandates established in Furman. To date, the Court has all but 
abdicated its responsibility for ensuring that the death penalty “be 
imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all.”155 
  
 
 155.  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1981); accord Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 
1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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Std. Dev. Min Max 
DP Notice 0.322 0.468 0 1 
Total Aggs 2.276 1.091 1 7 
1993 0.091 0.288 0 1 
1994 0.127 0.334 0 1 
1995 0.159 0.366 0 1 
1996 0.133 0.340 0 1 
1997 0.144 0.351 0 1 
1998 0.110 0.313 0 1 
1999 0.104 0.305 0 1 
2000 0.132 0.339 0 1 
# of Defs 1.793 1.109 1 7 
Def White 0.248 0.432 0 1 
Def Black 0.728 0.445 0 1 
Def Latino 0.018 0.136 0 1 
Def Male 0.946 0.226 0 1 
Def Age 27.15 9.935 17 69 
Def Contemp Fels 1.724 1.602 0 9 
Def Prior Fels 0.514 1.332 0 10 
Def # of Children 0.583 0.493 0 1 
Def Employed 0.562 0.496 0 1 
Def Married 0.179 0.383 0 1 
Def HS Grad 0.262 0.440 0 1 
Def Fam History156 1.451 1.254 0 5 
Def WRAT157 7.619 2.801 1 13 
Def IQ 100.341 14.798 50 151 
Def Psych Status158 1.198 0.478 1 4 
Firearm Homicide 0.649 0.477 0 1 
# of Vics 1.185 0.504 1 6 
Vic White 0.442 0.497 0 1 
Vic Black 0.504 0.500 0 1 
Vic Latino 0.032 0.178 0 1 
Vic Female 0.360 0.480 0 1 
Vic Age 36.72 18.20 0 99 
Vic Stranger 0.350 0.477 0 1 
Interracial Crime 0.283 0.451 0 1 




 156.  This is a summary measure of how many risk factors for criminality were present in the 
defendant’s family environment during childhood (alcohol/drug abuse, emotional/psychological 
abuse, physical abuse, family criminality, “broken home”). 
 157.  Wide Range Achievement Test (reading, math, and spelling). 
 158.  Defendant’s psychiatric status (no impairment, minimal, serious, severe). 
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Table 2: Death Notices by Judicial Circuit (1993-2000) 
Judicial Circuit  Death Notices  Percent of Total Death Notices 
Alapaha  3  0.8 
Alcovy  6  1.5 
Appalachian  1  0.3 
Atlanta  21  5.3 
Atlantic  11  2.8 
Augusta  29  7.2 
Blue Ridge  3  0.8 
Brunswick  16  4.0 
Chattahoochee  16  4.0 
Cherokee  9  2.3 
Clayton  19  4.8 
Cobb  11  2.8 
Conasauga  1  0.3 
Cordele  3  0.8 
Coweta  6  1.5 
Dougherty  7  1.8 
Douglas  3  0.8 
Dublin  1  0.3 
Eastern  10  2.5 
Flint  9  2.3 
Griffin  17  4.3 
Gwinnett  13  3.3 
Houston  2  0.5 
Lookout Mountain  3  0.8 
Macon  8  2.0 
Middle  8  2.0 
Mountain  2  0.5 
Northeastern  11  2.8 
Northern  9  2.3 
Ocmulgee  26  6.5 
Oconee  2  0.5 
Ogeechee  10  2.5 
Pataula  3  0.8 
Paulding  5  1.3 
Rockdale  4  1.0 
Rome  5  1.3 
South Georgia  2  0.5 
Southern  12  3.0 
Southwestern  4  1.0 
Stone Mountain  25  6.3 
Tallapoosa  6  1.5 
Tifton  8  2.0 
Waycross  12  3.0 
Western   18  4.5 
Total Death Notices: 400 
Percent of all judicial circuits filing a death notice: 96% 
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Table 3: Regional (In)Consistency: Model-Based Predictions 
Predicted number of death notices filed against defendants if the 
statewide charging practices were similar to: 
 
• Cobb Circuit (5th percentile): 274 
• Northeastern Circuit (50th percentile): 413 
• Griffin Circuit (95th percentile): 681 
 
Figure 1: Probability of a Factually Similar Case Receiving a Death 
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Figure 2: Probability of a Factually Similar Case Receiving a Death 




0 .2 .4 .6
Probability of D eath N otice
AlapahaAlcovyAppalachianAtlantaAtlanticAugustaBlue RidgeBrunswickChattahoocheeCherokeeClaytonCobbConasaugaCordeleCowetaDoughertyDouglasDublinEasternEnotahFlintGriffinGwinnettHouston
Lookout MountainMaconMiddleMountainNortheasternNorthernOcm ulgeeOconeeOgeecheePataulaPiedmontRockdaleRomeSouth GeorgiaSouthernSouthwesternStone M ountainTallapoosaTiftonToombsWaycrossWestern
